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Commentary
The Insider Trading Sanctions Bill - A
Neglected Opportunity
MILTON V. FREEMANt
I.

Introduction

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed a bill, H.R. 559,1 tripling the penalties for what it calls

insider trading. The Bill, an additional enforcement tool which
may be accepted by the Senate, has so far met no substantial
objections. It has passed the House.
The Bill, however, proceeds on the basis that what the SEC
views as "insider trading" is adequately dealt with by the Commission's existing Rule 10b-5.' It does not seek to amend or
modify the substance of that Rule, but only to create an additional penalty for that which is illegal under the Rule.
It is submitted that this is an unduly narrow approach. Recent Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 3 and Rule 10b-5 were
designed only to prohibit uses of nonpublic information that
amount to fraud.4 Yet many uses of nonpublic information may
be unfair without amounting to fraud. The time has come to ent A.B., City College of New York; LL.B., Columbia Law School; Partner, Arnold &
Porter, 1200 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Wash., D.C. 20036; Ass't Solicitor, SEC, 19421944. The author wishes to express his appreciation for the assistance of his colleague
Eric Summergrad in the preparation of this Commentary. Mr. Summergrad also participated in the preparation of the briefs in the Supreme Court in Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct.
3255 (1983), in which the author's firm represented Mr. Dirks.
1. H.R. 559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The Bill has been denominated the "Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983."
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
4. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983). See also Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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act a separate and specific statute broadening the class of activities outlawed. This statute would not be limited to frauds covered by Rule 10b-5, but rather would be designed to outlaw
transactions involving unfair use of information, whether inside
or outside," and regardless of whether shareholders were defrauded. The objective would be to protect the reputation of the
markets as fair places to deal and not as a gambling game where
marked cards are permissible.
II.

The Scope of Rule 10b-5 and Proposed Bill H.R. 559
Rule 10b-5 was adopted some forty years ago to deal with a
case of fraudulent use of truly inside information.' The Rule was
adopted because of a report that "the president of some company.. . is. . .buying up the stock from his own shareholders
at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the company
is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be
quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year.""
That case involved not only direct misrepresentation but violation of a fiduciary obligation of disclosure owed by the president
of the corporation to the shareholders in his own corporation,
conduct plainly amounting to common law fraud.
As a result of the adoption of Rule 10b-5 purchasing or selling by corporate insiders on the basis of such inside information
has been unquestionably illegal for more than forty years. Such
conduct has been subject to criminal penalties, 9 SEC injunctive

5. "Inside" information is information coming from inside the corporation - such
as earnings figures or new products - which is confidential information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.
"Outside" or "market" information is information - such as the fact that a takeover is
planned - which is likely to have an effect on the market for the company's stock. The
Supreme Court has refused to draw a distinction between the two types of information
for purposes of Rule 10b-5. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S.Ct. at 3262 n.15; Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. at 241 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
6. The author, in 1942, was co-draftsman of Rule 10b-5 in his capacity as Assistant
Solicitor of the SEC.
7. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAW 891, 922 (1967), cited in Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-13 n.32 (1976), quoted in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 767 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8. Likewise, outsiders who improperly receive inside information from insiders
("tippees") may acquire the same duties as an insider and may be prohibited from trading on that information. See generally Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983).
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982).
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proceedings,' 0 and to the right of the defrauded shareholder to
recover civil damages." The law on this point is unambiguous,
and requires no clarification or amendment.
The SEC-sponsored Bill would increase the penalties for
any person found to have violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
"by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material nonpublic information." It does not purport to broaden the
scope of what constitutes a violation under section 10(b) of the
Act and Rule 10b-5. But the incentive for the Bill is the unfairness observed by the Commission in cases where persons have
knowledge of impending tender offers or other similar developments and trade on that knowledge to their profit.' s Typically in
such cases, the persons sought to be punished are not officers,
directors, or other insiders of the corporation, but rather outsiders obtaining "market" information from the outside tender offerors or persons related to those tender offerors. In my judgment it is extremely difficult to suggest that such persons owe
the kind of fiduciary obligation to the persons with whom they
deal, or commit the fraud that Rule 10b-5 was intended to deal
with, or indeed fall within any possible extended scope of the
Rule.
Unfair use of information by outsiders such as tender offerors should not be treated on the same basis as insider trading by
corporation officials dealing with their own shareholders. The
two categories of transactions are in practice and in legal theory
completely different and require distinct treatment. Thus, it is a
misnomer to call the proposal an "Insider Trading Sanctions

10. Section 21(d) of the 1934 Act authorizes the Commission to
bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, or the United States courts of any
territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin
such acts or practices [in violation of the securities laws], and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted
without bond.
Id. § 78u(d).
11. The right of defrauded shareholders to recover damages under Rule lOb-5 was
recently reaffirmed in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 686-87 (1983).
12. See supra note 1.
13. See, e.g., Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 559 Before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,and Financeof the House
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 19-20 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings] (comments of SEC Chairman John S. R. Shad).
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Act" when its motivation is, in fact, to deal principally with un4

fair use of information by outsiders.
The fundamental legal obstacle is that in true insider trading, such as the case which occasioned the adoption of Rule 10b5,15 an officer of a corporation is trading in shares with one of his
own shareholders to whom he owes a strong legal, indeed a
fiduciary, obligation to advise truthfully as to the affairs of the
corporation. 16 This behavior is properly covered by a rule
against fraud because the conduct of the officer is clearly fraudulent under established common law standards, and his share7
holder is a defrauded party.'
In comparison, an outsider not connected with the shareholder's corporation who knows that a third party intends to
make an offer for the shares at a higher price, is under no obligation to disclose this knowledge to the shareholder or to dissuade
him from selling. This was clearly established by the Supreme
Court in Chiarella v. United States.'8 Chiarella involved a
printer who obtained information about pending takeover offers
while working for the purchasing companies. When he used that
information to trade in the stock of the target companies and
reap a profit, he was charged with defrauding the investors from
whom he purchased. The Supreme Court held this charge could
not stand - the sellers were not defrauded since Chiarela was a
stranger to them and owed them no fiduciary duty of disclosure.
In the absence of a finding of fraud, the Court held, section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would not apply. 19
14. The author has made this point in previous publications. See Freeman, 'Insider
Trading' v. 'Unfair Use', Nat'l L.J., June 13, 1983, at 15; Freeman, Legislative Action
Called "Desirable"for Resolution of Insider Trader Problems, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 14, 1981,
reprinted in 10 SEC '82. He has also made this point in testimony before the House
subcommittee conducting hearings on H.R. 559.
15. See Freeman, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
16. This obligation is owed both the existing shareholders from whom the insider is
buying and to potential shareholders to whom the insider is selling. See Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
17. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). This principle was recognized by
the state courts as early as 1903. See Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903);
Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904).
18. 445 U.S. 222, 231-35 (1980).
19. Id. at 234-35. Following Chiarella, the SEC attempted to cover the situation
presented in that case by promulgating Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1983), which
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The same principle - that, absent such a fiduciary obligation, Rule 10b-5 does not prohibit trading on nonpublic information - was reaffirmed by the Court this past term in Dirks v.
S.E.C.2 In Dirks, the Court reversed an SEC administrative
censure issued against a stock analyst who, in the course of his
work, learned about massive fraud at an insurance company
from former employees at the company.2 1 The analyst told a
number of people in the investment community about his findings, some of whom subsequently sold their stock in the company. The SEC charged the analyst with aiding and abetting violations of Rule 10b-5 by causing these persons to trade on
nonpublic material information.22 In reversing the censure, the
Court found that the information was not public, and assumed
that it was material.2 " The Court held, however, that the analyst
was an outsider of the company who owed no duty of disclosure
to company shareholders. In the absence of any such duty, the
Court held, there could be no fraud on the shareholders and no
violation of Rule 10b-5.2 4
As was to be expected, the government has not willingly accepted the repeated judgments of the Supreme Court and is now
seeking to avoid them by ingenious legal theories which may, in
certain courts and for a period of time, be at least partially successful. For example, in United States v. Newman 25 the government has successfully prosecuted a stock trader who was in exactly the same position as Chiarella, trading stock in companies
that were the targets of tender offers. Like Chiarella, the stock
trader learned of the tender offers indirectly from an investment
house working for the companies planning the takeovers.2 6 And,
expressly prohibits trading on any nonpublic information concerning tender offers. The
problem with this approach is that section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1981), under which Rule 14e-3 was promulgated, is modeled on section
10(b) and, like that section, should probably only be read to prohibit acts which amount
to fraud. Thus, Rule 14e-3 may well be no more applicable to outsider trading situations
than Rule 10b-5 is.
20. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
21. Id. at 3250.
22. Id. at 3259.
23. Id. at 3260-61.
24. Id.
25. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd after remand, No. 82-1273 slip op. (2d Cir. Feb.
8, 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3266 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 82-1653).
26. Id. at 15.
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like Chiarella, the trader did not owe any fiduciary duties of disclosure to the shareholders of the target companies.21 The conviction was achieved nonetheless by an instruction to the jury
that they need not consider whether any investor was defrauded,
but could find the defendant guilty if the information had been
obtained or used in violation of duties of confidentiality owed to
the investment house.
An even more unusual approach was proposed by the SEC,
and adopted by the federal district court in California, in S.E.C.
v. Lund.28 That case involved an individual who was approached
by the president of a company with an offer to participate in a
joint venture which the company was planning with a third
party. Although Lund did not join in the venture, he did
purchase stock in the company, reaping a profit after the joint
venture was announced.29 In finding Lund liable under Rule
10b-5, the court held that although Lund was not an officer, director, or employee of the company, he became, simply by receiving nonpublic information about the company, a "temporary
insider" of the company.30 This theory is at best problematic.
The court cited as authority a footnote in Dirks in which the
Supreme Court noted that certain outsiders who "have entered
into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the [company]" may acquire the same duties insiders
have." But that footnote only stated that certain persons such as "an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation" - might become subject to an insider's
duties as a result of being retained by a corporation. 2 There was
27. That the trader owed no duty to the shareholders was affirmed in a related civil
suit brought by the shareholders under Rule 10b-5. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, [Current]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,478 (2d Cir. 1983).
28. [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,495 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
29. Id. at 96,872.
30. Id. at 96,874. The Commission had originally pressed the theory that Lund was
a "tippee" of a corporate insider, since he had received information about the venture
from the company's president. In the wake of Dirks, however, the Commission abandoned that theory since it was apparent that the president had breached no duty in
disclosing this information to Lund during legitimate business discussions. Under Dirks,
finding of such a breach would be a predicate to finding "tippee" liability. Id. at 96,873.
31. Id. at 98,874 (quoting Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14).
32. Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14. The footnote is in fact adopted from a
part of the argument of Dirks' counsel in the Supreme Court. Cf. Brief for Appellant at
31-34, Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
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absolutely nothing to suggest that a person who was not retained
by the firm, and who acquired information in arms-length discussions about a possible business transaction, became a common law fiduciary towards the company with which he was negotiating." Indeed, it is hard to see how such a duty can be
conjured up out of Dirks in light of the Court's favorable reading of the Second Circuit's decision in Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co.a" In Walton, an investment banking firm, on behalf of
a client, approached a corporation viewed by its clients as a possible takeover target. In the course of discussions with the target, the firm acquired confidential earnings figures. The investment banking firm traded on the information, reaping a profit
when the figures were disclosed.," As the Dirks Court noted with
approval, the firm did not acquire fiduciary duties simply because it acquired confidential information from a company in an
arms-length negotiation with the company., Yet based on nothing more than the fact that Lund acquired confidential information in an arms-length business discussion with a company's
president, the Lund court found that he did acquire fiduciary
37
duties.
III. Analysis and Recommendations
The Commission may, of course, continue to be successful
in pressing such theories. It is suggested here that whether or
not the Commission is successful in partially circumventing the
Chiarella v. United States s and Dirks v. S.E.C. 9 cases, it is
33. The court in Lund suggested that it was sufficient that Lund acquired this information because he was a longtime friend and business associate of the president of the
company. This, the court said, gave him a "special relationship" with the company.
S.E.C. v. Lund, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,495, at 96,874. But it is clear that
Lund was not given this information as a favor from a friend - if that had been the case
he would be a "tippee" under Dirks. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. at 3265. And while
Lund, as a likely business partner, did enjoy special access to information about the joint
venture that other investors did not enjoy, that is insufficient to establish a duty under
Rule 10b-5. Just such a "special access" rule was proposed by the dissenters in Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and rejected by the majority
in that case. Id. at 230.
34. 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980).
35. Id. at 797.
36. Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. at 3265 n.22.
37. S.E.C. v. Lund, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,495, at 96,874.
38. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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pursuing a myopic and unnecessarily restrictive course in attempting to do so. It also faces years of litigation, with the outcome uncertain, by trying to fit the conduct of such outsiders
into a fraud mold. The SEC is so accustomed to the use of Rule
10b-5 as a be-all and end-all that it has not adequately recognized that the problem it is facing is of a different character,
larger than can readily be managed within that narrow compass.
40
There is an easier answer, as I have repeatedly pointed out:
specific legislation addressed to the problem of outsider trading.
For the problem the Commission faces today is a result of
the proliferation of tender offers by outsiders and the creation of
an option market in which the traders are not insiders and owe
no fiduciary obligation to shareholders. Accordingly, the problem is not one that can be handled within the scope of a standard and a rule designed to protect the individual from fraud.
Instead, the concern the Commission does have and should
have is that persons unfairly using information about coming
events, such as tender offers, are engaged in socially unacceptable and publicly condemned conduct. For example, Chiarella's
counsel did not seek to defend the morality of his actions even
in the Supreme Court, but contended successfully only that it
was not covered by the anti-fraud Rule designed to protect investors. Similar condemnation of the conduct of Chiarella was
voiced by almost all members of the Supreme Court in that case,
the majority and dissenters alike. 4 1 In the legislative considerations of the SEC-endorsed insider trading sanctions Bill, the
Congressional Committee joined in the broad condemnation of
the kind of conduct involved there. Indeed it was one of the
members of the committee who suggested the analogy used
above to playing with marked cards."2
In other words, Congress and the courts are sufficiently of-

39. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
40. See supra note 14.
41. All members of the Court implicitly recognized that Chiarella's conduct was
"unfair." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 232, 241, 252 (1980).
42. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 66-67 (remarks of Jim Bates, member of Comm.
on Energy & Commerce). Industry witnesses were concerned with other problems. Nevertheless they endorsed the suggestion presented by the writer that a new and separate
bill be adopted outlawing the kind of conduct in which Chiarella engaged, independent
of any concept of fraud.
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fended by this type of conduct that they would consider adopting a standard outlawing outsider trading involving unfair uses
of information without limiting the enforcing agency to a fraud
concept. This standard could outlaw purchases of securities or
options trading or any other means which allow persons in possession of this unfair advantage to make money as Chiarella did.
Such legislation would be easily adopted if supported on an
institutional basis. If the SEC were to make such a suggestion,
there would be no difficulty in having it promptly adopted by
both houses of the Congress, since there is no constituency opposed to legislation outlawing unfair use of information in the
markets.
Problems about the precise definition and scope of such a
law would have to be addressed, but these issues should be easily resolved. The SEC is in a position to take the leading role
and to secure congressional approval for which it would and
should get credit.
To date, it has been reluctant to take this initiative and has
not accepted the suggestion for such legislation which the writer
put forth in testimony on H.R. 559.4" However, the setback that
the Commission has since received in the decision against it by
the Supreme Court in the Dirks case has caused it to reconsider.
There is a reasonable possibility that it may, after such reconsideration, seek to introduce and support legislation to this end.
If it does so, it will meet no opposition in the Congress or in the
financial industry, and it will be welcomed by the courts which
are outraged by the immoral conduct involved, but have not yet
been given the tools to deal with it. Such legislation could be
readily adopted as stated.

43. Hearings, supra note 13, at 159-60.
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